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CORPORATIONS: A PARENT MAY NOT ALLOCATE
TO ITSELF SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE TAX
SAVINGS RESULTING FROM CONSOLIDATED RETURNS
T HE Internal Revenue Code permits the filing of consolidated in-
come tax returns by an affiliated group of corporations.' Although
the Code regulates the manner in which tax liability of the affiliated
group will be apportioned among member corporations, 2 it makes
no provision as to the allocation of tax savings which result from the
consolidation. In Case v. New York Cent. R.R.3 the New York Su-
preme Court, Appellate Division, held that a parent corporation with
a net operating loss may not allocate to itself substantially all of the
tax savings realized by its subsidiary through a consolidated return.
The parent, New York Central, owned eighty per cent of the
common stock of Mahoning Railroad Company, and leased all of
Mahoning's facilities under an agreement whereby it paid all main-
tenance and operating expenses and in addition paid to Mahoning
forty per cent of gross income from that operation. As a result of
an election to file consolidated returns during 1957-1960, New York
Central's net operating losses eliminated entirely Mahoning's tax
liability for those years, effecting a savings to Mahoning of
$3,825,717.43. Pursuant to an agreement,4 Mahoning allocated to
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1501; 8 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATIoN § 46 (Zimet
rev. 1957). Most corporations are includible in an affiliated group; exceptions are
listed in INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 1504 (b). "Affiliated group" is defined as one or
more chains of includible corporations connected by 80%0 stock ownership either
directly by an includible parent corporation, or indirectly through subsidiaries of that
parent. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1504(a). Consent by all members of the affiliated
group is required to file a consolidated return; however, the making of that return
is considered consent. INT.' RV. CODE OF 1954, § 1501. The consolidated taxable
income of the group is taxed at the normal rate increased by 2%, INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1503 (a), with exceptions as to certain types of corporations, including the rail-
road companies involved in Case, which are taxed at the normal corporate rate. INT.
REv, CODE OF 1954, § 1503 (b).
2 Generally, the tax liability of the group may be allocated proportionately among
those member corporations contributing taxable income to the consolidation or by
any other method selected by the group with approval of the Secretary or his delegate.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1552.
1119 App. Div. 2d 383, 243 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1963).
ICentral and thirty-four of its affiliates were parties to that agreement; however,
the affiliates other than Mahoning were either wholly owned by Central or were
operated under leases obligating Central to pay all federal income taxes, or operated in
such a way that expenses of the operation equalled income, resulting in no taxable
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Central ninety-three per cent of the savings, leaving a net gain to
to Mahoning of $268,725.28. The dividend expectancy of Mahon-
ing's minority stockholders thus became $53,751.05, approximately
one and one half per cent of the total tax savings.5 In a derivative
action brought by members of that minority, the appellate division,
in a 3-2 decision, rescinded the allocation agreement and ordered
an accounting for the entire amount allocated to Central, resulting
in a retention by Mahoning of the total savings produced by the
consolidation.
The court did not dwell long in finding Central's domination and
control of Mahoning. At the time of the allocation agreement, there
were seven members of Mahoning's board of directors,6 all of whom
were nominees of Central, and six of whom were officials of Central
or other Central subsidiaries. Mahoning's officers were all officers
or employees of Central or its subsidiaries. The allocation agree-
ment had been prepared by Central's director of taxes, and no inde-
pendent counsel had represented Mahoning in its preparation. 7
Although the court failed to expressly state the standard used in
determining that the allocation should be rescinded, it apparently
followed the prevailing view adhered to in New York, the federal
courts and a majority of the states. By that rule, contracts between
affiliated corporations are voidable only for unfairness., The rule
recognizes that the complex corporate relationships existing today are
gain. In effect, the allocation agreement was operative only as to Central and
Mahoning. Id. at 385, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
5By the terms of the agreement, generally, all income tax savings were allocated to
the member corporation contributing the loss, whereas the savings of the 15%
tax on intercorporate dividends, resulting from the consolidation, were allocated to
the corporations paying those dividends. Id. at 384-86, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 621-22. In his dis-
sent, Steuer, J. suggested that the agreement allowed many methods of calculating the
amount of that allocation, that the 93% to 7% distribution adopted by the majority
opinion was the result of a calculation which would show the greatest disparity, and
that if calculations had been by other methods, the benefit to Mahoning's minority
stockholders would have been greater. Id. at 390, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
' Brief for Plaintiff, p. 6.
"19 App. Div. 2d at 386, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
8 Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Chelrob, Inc. V.
Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E.2d 825 (1944); Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d
18 (1942); 3 F.xTCHmR, PIVATE COmRORATIONS § 962 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1947); BAL-
LANTINE, CORORATIONS § 72, at 181-82 (rev. ed. 1946). It is not uncommon for the
decisions to be in terms of bad faith, unreasonableness, overreaching and the like,
either in addition to or instead of the standard of fairness. However, it would seem
that at least in the context of allocation agreements such as involved in Case, the
standard of fairness is inclusive of all of those additional considerations, and is so
used herein.
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not necessarily undesirable. Directors with duties common to
several corporations are free to approve intercorporate transactions,
knowing that those transactions, if fair to both corporations, will
not be disturbed. However, such transactions will be subject to
judicial scrutiny when, as in Case, it is alleged that the interests of
one corporation have been advanced by sacrificing the interests of
the other.9
Affiliated groups are permitted to file consolidated returns only
if eighty per cent of all voting stock and eighty per cent of each
class of non-voting stock of each corporation is directly owned by
one or more of the other corporations includible in the group.'0
Thus, agreements between those corporations allocating the result-
ing tax savings must inherently be subject to such judicial scrutiny.
In the only two reported cases involving the allocation of consoli-
dated return savings, agreements had been entered into by the
affiliated corporations. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co.," held that
where the agreement allocated the entire savings to the profit
corporation, that agreement may not be attacked by minority stock-
holders of the loss corporation. There the profit corporation re-
tained as a gain the amount which it otherwise would have paid in
tax, whereas the loss corporation relinquished its net operating loss
which otherwise would have had potential value as a carryback or a
carryforward. In Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank,'2 where the agreement
allocated all of the savings to the loss corporation, the Florida Dis-
trict Court of Appeals held the allocation to be an illegal dividend
and ordered an accounting for the entire amount.
Thus, retention of the entire tax savings by the profit corporation
may be fair; allocation of the entire savings to the loss corporation,
I The allocation of the burden of proof in this regard obviously might be deter-
minative. The dissent in Case suggested that a great part of the effort by each party
was made toward shifting that burden to the other; however, the majority did not
expressly locate that burden. FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 8, § 973 at 456, suggests the
majority view to be that there is a presumption of unfairness, placing on the party
who would sustain the transaction the burden of proving its fairness.
20 See note 1 supra.
i' 197 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1951), rev'd and remanded for reconsideration of denial of
petition for rehearing en banc, 345 U.S. 247 (1953), referred to division to hear petition
for rehearing en banc, 205 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1953), petition for rehearing en banc
denied, 206 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1953).
2, 136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962), ar'd per curiam, 149 So. 2d 45 (Fla.
1963).
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at least when it is the parent corporation, 3 is illegal; Case adds that
allocation of ninety-three per cent of the savings to the loss contrib-
uting parent is unfair. The specificity of these holdings furnish but
meager guidelines for the annual disposition of large amounts of
corporate assets.
Fundamental to an analysis of the unique problem in any tax
savings allocation situation is an understanding of what the alloca-
tions actually are. Although the result in Alliegro would seem
desirable, it is unfortunate that the court chose to consider the al-
location a dividend,' 4 declaring it illegal, rather than subjecting the
allocation to scrutiny for fairness. The tax savings allocated in any
consolidated return situation are the product of a common under-
taking by all members of an affiliated group, each contributing a
net operating loss or current profit, resulting in a proportionate re-
duction or an elimination of the tax each profit corporation would
have paid absent consolidation.' 5 Conceptually, the savings cannot
be considered as having been earned solely by the profit corporation.
They would seem to be more in the nature of profit from a joint
venture. That profit is a gain by the affiliated group constituting
the venture, and thus cannot yet be considered an asset on the books
of any member corporation.16 Only that portion of the gain finally
I8 There had been previous years in which the subsidiary, having sustained a loss,
had received payments from the parent, presumably pursuant to the same allocation
agreement. Id. at 658.
1 In declaring the allocations illegal dividends, the Florida court purported to follow
a Tax Court decision, Beneficial Corp., 18 T.C. 396 (1952) (facts essentially iden-
tical to Alliegro, 136 So. 2d 656, 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962)). In Beneficial, the Tax
Court found the definition of taxable dividends, INT. R v. CODE OF 1939, § 115 (a),
broad enough to cover allocation agreement payments by the subsidiaries to the parent
in excess of the tax liabilities properly allocable to the subsidiaries in the consolidated
return. 18 T.C. at 399. As explained in the text supported by note 16 infra, it is at
least arguable that such payments cannot be considered dividends for any purpose.
Furthermore, as suggested by the defendant in Case, there are many instances in which
the tax law treats a payment as a dividend where dividend consequences would not
attach under state corporate law. Brief for Defendants-Respondents, p. 46. Some ex-
amples cited are: interest payments on corporate debt obligations, R.M. Gunn, 25 T.C.
424 (1955); principal amount paid in redemption of corporate debt obligations,
Gooding Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408 (1954); principal amount paid in redemption of
common or preferred stock, INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 802 (d), 306. The court,
in Case, expressly reserved decision on whether the payments by Mahoning to Central
were the equivalent of dividends. 19 App. Div. 2d 388, 243 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1963).
2' See Western Pac. R.R. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 277 (1953) (Jackson,
J. dissenting from procedural remand).
16 There is no direct authority for this proposition; however, Mr. Justice Jackson's
dissent from procedural remand in Western Pac. R.R. strongly suggests a joint venture
type approach to the problem. Ibid.
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allocated to the individual corporation should be considered sur-
plus17 from which dividends might be declared by that corporation.
In any such situation, the ultimate question must be what is a
fair allocation of the total tax savings. The sole contribution of each
party to the consolidation is a current profit or a net loss. Either
has value, if not committed to the consolidation, only for purposes
of a net operating loss carryover,'8 and even then has value only to
the corporation which generated that profit or loss. Hence, the
"market value" of either can never be determined because neither is
"salable" outside of a consolidated return situation, and there can
never be arm's length bargaining between affiliated corporations. 19
If the potential value of a loss or a profit for carryover purposes
could always be realized,20 the problem would have the simple solu-
tion of the equal division of the total savings. The net loss or profit
could be given the full face value of its effect in a carryover situation;
then when committed instead to a consolidation, the profit and the
loss actually absorbed would be equal. Profit years, however, are not
always preceded or followed by losses within the three year and
seven year limits for the taking of carryover deductions;2' nor are
loss years always preceded or followed by profit. Thus, depending
on the nature of the allocation agreement being drafted and the situa-
tion of the corporations involved, there must inevitably be some
speculation by the contracting parties as to the value of the net loss
or net profit to be committed to the consolidation. For this reason,
17 The term surplus as used here is consistent with the usage in corporation law,
and should not be confused with the definition of dividends, for tax purposes, which
encompasses generally any distribution of property from earnings and profits. INT.
REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 316.
18 For example, in Case, Central's net operating losses for 1957-1960 would, generally,
have been carried forward as a net operating loss deduction in any profit year within
seven years after the year in which the loss had occurred, or carried back as a de-
duction in an amended return for a prior profit year. Mahoning had no prior net
operating losses which could have been carried forward as deductions in any year
during 1957-1960; therefore, the potential value of its net profits during those years
for carryover purposes could be realized only in the unlikely event that it incur a
loss in a subsequent year which could be carried back on an amended return
as net operating loss deductions. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172.
1" 19 App. Div. 2d 386, 243 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1963).
20 See discussion note 18 supra.
21 See discussion note 18 supra. Although most taxpayers may take net operating
loss carryforward to each of the five years following the taxable year of such loss, a
regulated transportation corporation may take them to each of the seven following
years. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172 (b) (1) (C).
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courts should allow some latitude in determining the fairness of the
allocation in each case.
Viewing the transaction from the time of trial rather than from
the date of its inception,22 the court in Case found that even if
Central had filed separate returns for 1957-1960, its net operating
losses for those years would have "never ripened into operating
loss deductions." 23 Unfortunately, the court apparently did not
consider the extreme improbability of Mahoning's ever incurring
net operating losses which could be carried back to 1957-1960, or
the fact that there had been no prior losses which could have been
carried forward during 1957-1960. Those losses could not exist
because by the terms of its lease agreement with Central, Mahoning
was "practically guaranteed taxable income into the indefinite
future."24 Thus, as a practical matter, neither Central's net loss
nor Mahoning's net profit for 1957-1960 had any significant carry-
over value for separate return purposes; yet, when committed to a
consolidated return they generated a very significant common gain.
It would seem that if an equal division of the gain could be justified
when, in the hypothetical, the full potential of each could have been
realized by the filing of separate returns, an equal division of the tax
savings would also be justified where neither the loss nor profit had
significant separate return value. In fact, if the court had viewed
the agreement from the time of its inception, a less than equal
division, in favor of Central, would have been fair. Central at least
continued its existence in anticipation of profit,25 whereas Mahoning,
under its lease agreement, could hardly have expected to incur a
loss. 26
,2 An important question, not expressly answered by the court in Case, would
seem to be the extent to which courts should utilize the advantage of hindsight in
determining the fairness of allocation agreements entered into years before.
" 19 App. Div. 2d 386, 243 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1963). This was correct so far as
carryback deductions were concerned; however, it is not so dearly correct as to carry-
forward deductions. As of the dates of the trial and of the appellate division's decision
there remained some time within the seven year limit for operating loss carryforward
deductions. INT. RIv. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b) (1) (C).
"19 App. Div. 2d 384, 243 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1963).
"Central had seven years to generate profits against which its losses during 1957-
1960 could have been applied as net operating loss deductions. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954,
§ 172 (b) (1) (C).
26 Mahoning could have carried back as net operating loss deductions only losses
incurred within three years after each profit year involved. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 172 (b) (1) (A) (i). The possibility of that happening had practically expired by the
date of the appellate division's derision.
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The court obviously felt the 93% to 7% allocation to be un-
fair. It would seem, however, that by ordering an accounting in
favor of Mahoning for the entire allocation it reached an equally
unfair result. The allocation agreement gave Mahoning's minority
stockholder 1 2% of the total tax savings. The court's order gives
them 20%. Yet, if the consolidated return is considered in the na-
ture of a joint venture, the minority stockholder's "equity" in that
venture would seem to have been no more than 10%. 27 Further-
more, because a stockholder's derivative action is representative
rather than personal,28 the rights of Central's stockholders, who in
reality are Mahoning's majority stockholders, should also have been
considered. Their "equity" in the joint venture was at least
90%,29 whereas, after the accounting they will realiz only 80%
of the gain. The New York cases indicate that courts of equity,
in which derivative actions are brought, have rewritten the price
terms of executed contracts between affiliated corporations to obtain
results which are fair to all stockholders involved.30 There would
seem to be no sound reason why that same remedy should not be
equally applicable to executed allocation agreements such as the one
involved in Case.
The unique character of allocation agreements will always make
them subject to judicial scrutiny. When so scrutinized, it would
seem that the consolidated return can realistically be considered
only in the nature of a joint venture; and, where the profits of such a
venture are found to be unfairly allocated, the remedy in a court of
equity need not be merely rescission of the agreement but rather a
rewriting of its terms to obtain a fairness to all parties concerned.
2T Their "equity" would be their 20% participation in Mahoning's equal, or 50%,
participation with Central in the joint venture, i.e., 10%. Furthermore, their "equity"
might be considered less than 10%, if a less than equal division was found to be justified
because of the unequal probabilities of future profits by Central and future losses by
Mahoning. See note 29 infra.
2"13 FLL-rcsRa, op. cit. supra note 8, § 5939.
-" In an equal division of the savings, their "equity" would be their 100% partici-
pation in Central's equal, or 50%, participation plus their 80% participation in Mahon-
ing's 50% participation in the joint venture, i.e., 90%. Furthermore, the fact that
eventual profit by Central seems more likely than losses by Mahoning might justify
some unequal division, in favor of Central, although not as unequal as the 93% to 7%
division effected by the allocation agreement.
" Ripley v. International Rys. of CA., 8 N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d 443, 209 N.Y.S.2d
289 (1960); Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E.2d 825 (1944).
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